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Every time I teach a class on church and state, I am reminded again of
how much we owe to the religious minorities in our midst. If it were not
for Amish, Quakers, I Jews, 2 Santerians 3 and especially Jehovah's
Witnesses, 4 what an impoverished understanding we would have, not only
of the religion clauses of the First Amendment, but also of the Free Speech
Clause. The original parents in Wisconsin v. Yoder5 are now grandparents,
and their children, with or without the benefit of a high school education,
have grown to adulthood and probably have children of their own. But 25
years later, we are still chewing over and learning from this case. My
focus in this essay is on the myriad ways we can learn from this case and
how we can use it to enrich our thinking about topics that, at first glance,
seem far removed from church and state, education, or the Amish.
I. A LIBERAL PERSPECTIVE ON YODER
My view of Yoder is heavily influenced by Joel Feinberg's 1980 essay,
6The Child's Right to an Open Future. Feinberg begins his discussion of
children's rights by noticing that rights ordinarily can be divided into four
Copyright © 1997, Dena S. Davis.
* Associate Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law.
See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1964) (holding that one does not
have to have a belief in a Supreme Being to qualify for exemption from the draft as a
conscientious objector).
2 Jews have not fared well under our Religious Clauses jurisprudence. In
Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961), the Supreme Court was not sympathetic to an
Orthodox Jew's complaint that compliance with Pennsylvania's Sunday closing laws would
virtually put him out of business, as he would have to close up shop on Saturday for the
religious observance and then on Sunday also. And in Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S.
503 (1986), the Court upheld an Air Force regulation that prohibited plaintiff from wearing
a yarmulke while on duty.
3 See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520
(1993) (striking down a zoning law prohibiting animal sacrifice).
4 See West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)
(upholding a child's right to refuse to say the Pledge of Allegiance).
5 .406 U.S. 205 (1972).
6 Joel Feinberg, The Child's Right to an Open Future, in WHOSE CHILD?
CHILDREN'S RIGHTS, PARENTAL AutnoRrry, AND STATE POWER 124 (William Aiken &
Hugh LaFollette, eds., 1980).
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kinds. First, there are rights that adults and children have in common (the
right not to be killed, for example). 7 Second, there are rights which are
generally possessed only by children (or by "childlike" adults).8 These
"dependency-rights," as Feinberg calls them, derive from the child's
dependence on others for such basics as food, shelter, and protection.
9
Third, there are rights which can be exercised only by adults (or at least by
children approaching adulthood), e.g., the free exercise of religion.'
0
Finally, there are rights which Feinberg calls "rights-in-trust," rights which
are to be "saved for the child until he is an adult."
I
These rights can be violated by adults in ways that cut off the
possibility that the child, when he or she achieves adulthood, can exercise
them. An example is the right to choose one's spouse. Children and
teenagers lack the legal and social grounds on which to assert such a right,
but clearly the child, when he or she attains adulthood, will have that right.
Therefore, the child now has the right not to be irrevocably betrothed to
someone. Rights in this category include a long list: virtually all the
important rights we believe adults have, but which must be protected now
to be exercised later. Grouped together, they constitute what Feinberg
calls, "the child's right to an open future."'
12
Feinberg uses this concept to make the fairly easy call that Jehovah's
Witness parents ought not to refuse a life-saving blood transfusion for the
mother of three young children, whose future is severely compromised if
their mother dies.' 3 It is even easier to argue that the right to an open
future forbids Jehovah's Witness parents from refusing necessary
transfusions for their minor children, who have the right to grow into their
own futures where they will decide such issues for themselves. Of course,
we notice immediately that this is a context not of blacks and whites, but
of many shades of gray. Many people argue that when children are raised
within such an isolationist and high-demand religious culture as Jehovah's
Witnesses, the idea that when they are 18 or 25 or whenever they
magically become able to make truly autonomous choices, that they are, in
Feinberg's words, "fully formed self-determining adult[s],' 14 is not
tenable.




1 Id. at 125-26. (emphasis in original).
12 Id. at 124.
13 See id. at 130.
14 Id. at 126.
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But where does one draw the line? Where should the state intervene;
or in less stringent terms, what ought public policy encourage when faced
with the dilemma of parents who seek to make choices for their children
that dramatically limit the children's possibilities for an open future? Most
readers of this essay probably agree that parents ought not to be allowed to
let their children die when medical intervention could restore them to long
and productive lives. I predict most of us would have no trouble siding
with the State of Wisconsin if the Amish had insisted on keeping their
children illiterate. Aside from the detriment to society of having an
illiterate subset within its midst, one can argue, taking a leaf from
Feinberg's book, that a person who reaches adulthood unable to read is
going to find her future so severely truncated that the state is morally
required to intervene.
15
Feinberg, in fact, declined to take issue with the Court's holding in
Yoder largely because he agreed with the concurring opinion of Justices
White, Brennan and Stewart that the difference between 8th grade, where
the Amish drew the line, and 10th grade, when most of the children would
have become 16 and therefore eligible to leave school in any case, was
"minor in terms of the children's interests."1 6 Feinberg agreed, however,
with the holding in the 1966 case, State v. Garber,'7 where the Kansas
Supreme Court refused to allow the Amish to keep their children out of
state-accredited schools altogether.18 Feinberg said:
The case against the exemption for the Amish must rest
entirely on the rights of Amish children, which the state as
parens patriae is sworn to protect. An education that
renders a child fit for only one way of life forecloses
irrevocably his other options .... [C]ritical life-decisions
will have been made irreversibly for a person well before
he reaches the age of full discretion when he should be
expected, in a free society, to make them himself.19
I am generally in agreement with Feinberg and would actually go
further and say that Yoder was wrongly decided. But I concede one
15 Cf id. at 128 (noting that "[c]hildren are not legally capable of defending
their own future interest against present infringement by their parents, so that task must be
performed for them, usually by the state... .
16 Id. at 137.
17 419 P.2d 896 (Kan. 1966).
is See id. at 131-32.
19 Feinberg, supra note 6, at 132 (emphasis in original).
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problem with this point of view. As a liberal who believes that the state
should not dictate notions of "the good life," Feinberg believes that the
state must be neutral about the goals of education, skewing the question
neither in favor of the Amish lifestyle nor in favor of the "modem,"
technological life most Americans accept.20 The goal of education is to
allow the child to make up her own mind from the widest array of options;
the best education is the one that gives the child the most open future.
Feinberg stated that a neutral decision
would assume only that education should equip the child
with the knowledge and skills that will help him choose
whichever sort of life best fits his native endowment and
matured disposition. It should send him out into the adult
world with as many open opportunities as possible, thus
maximizing his chances for self-fulfillment.2'
The problem here is that an education that gives a child this array of
choices would quite possibly make it impossible for her to choose to
remain Old Order Amish. Her "native endowment and matured
disposition" might now have taken her away from the kind of personality
and habits that would make Amish life pleasant. Even if she envies the
peace, warmth, and security that a life of tradition offers, she may find it
impossible to turn her back on "the world," and return to her lost
innocence. To quote the Amish, she may have failed irreversibly to
"acquire Amish attitudes"22 during "the crucial and formative adolescent
period."'23 This problem raises two issues. First, those of us who would
make arguments based on the child's right to an open future need to be
clear and appropriately humble about what we are offering. Insisting on a
child's right to a high school education may open a future wider than she
otherwise could have dreamed, but it also may foreclose one possible
future: as a content member of the Amish community. Second, if the
Amish are correct in saying that taking their children out of school at
grade eight is crucial for the child's development into a member of the
Amish community,24 then there is no "impartial" stance for the state to
20 Id. at 132-33.
21 Id. at 134-35.
22 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 250, 211 (1972).
23 Id.
24 See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 210-11 (1972).
Formal high school education beyond the eighth grade is contrary to
Amish beliefs ... because it takes them away from their community,
(continued)
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take. The state may well be impartial about whether the "better life" is to
be found within or without the Amish community, but it cannot act in an
impartial fashion: forcing the parents to send their children to school or
exempting them from the requirement each has likely consequences for
the child's continued existence within the community when she grows up
and is able to make a choice. Feinberg seeks to avoid this second problem
by claiming that the neutral state.., would act to
let all influences.., work equally on the child, to open up
all possibilities to him, without itself influencing him
toward one or another of these. In that way, it can be
hoped that the chief determining factor in the grown
child's choice of a vocation and life-style will be his own
governing values, talents, and propensities.
5
The problem with this is that, as I understand the Amish way of life, being
Amish is precisely not to make one's life choices on the basis of one's own
"talents and propensities," but to subordinate those individual leanings to
the traditions of the group.26 If one discovers within oneself a strong
passion and talent for jazz dancing, one ought to suppress it, not nurture it.
II. THINKING BEYOND YODER
A. Introduction
I take Yoder to be a paradigm for a number of challenging issues-not
necessarily legal but always involvingpublic policy-issues in which there
is a tension between some autonomy-based claim on behalf of the child set
against a parental claim to control over family life, and to the character
and education of their children. These claims of individual parents or
couples are probably at their most sympathetic when they are grounded in
culture and religion, as is the case with the Amish, and especially so when
physically and emotionally, during the crucial and formative adolescent
period of life. During this period, the children must acquire Amish
attitudes favoring manual work and self-reliance and the specific skills
needed to perform the adult role of an Amish farmer or housewife.
They must learn to enjoy physical labor.
Id. at 211.
25 Feinberg, supra note 6, at 136 (emphasis in original).
26 See, e.g., Yoder, 406 U.S. at 212 (noting one expert's testimony that the
Amish upbringing prepares adolescents to be "productive members of the Amish
community").
1997]
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the parents claim that without the ability to mold their children's lives,
their culture itself will be destroyed. I wish to challenge this sympathetic
perspective by pointing to two other contemporary examples of this sort of
issue.
B. Female Genital Mutilation
In at least 25 African countries, girls in babyhood or adolescence are
subjected to a surgical procedure in which their labia minora and labia
majora are cut away, the clitoris is removed, and, often, the vaginal
opening is stitched up with only a tiny passage left for urine and menstrual
fluid.27 When the young woman marries, the closed area is then cut
open. 8 This procedure is extraordinarily painful, often leads to infection
and even death, and makes normal sexual pleasure impossible.29  The
World Health Organization estimates that 90 million girls and women
have endured some form of female genital mutilation ("FGM"), and that 2
30
million girls undergo this practice every year.
This custom presents Western nations with a number of legal and
ethical challenges as immigrants from these African cultures come to our
shores. In 1991 in Britain, according to one estimate, 10,000 female
children were "circumcised." 3 1 Some of these operations were done in
people's kitchens, but others in private medical clinics in London and
Wales. 32 There are accounts, though without hard numbers, of the practice
continuing in the United States as well. 33  Some doctors defend
performing FGM by saying that if they refuse to perform the operation in
a safe and sanitary setting, it will be performed anyway, in a much more
dangerous fashion.34 Obvious legal issues arise: should a mother be jailed
27 See Judith S. Seddon, Possible or Impossible? A Tale of Two Worlds in One
Country,,5 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM, 265, 266-67 (1993).
See id. at 284. In some cases the ritual is carried out as a marriage rite. See
id.
29 See id. at 267-68.
30 See id. at 266.
31 See id. (citing Allison Wyte, Mutilated by an 'Act of Love,' INDEP.
(London), Feb. 19, 1991, at 15).
See id.
33 See Celia W. Dugger, Tug of Taboos: African Genital Rite vs. US. Law,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 1996 at A3; See also Neil MacFarquhar, Mutilation of Egyptian
Girls: Despite Ban, it goes on, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 1996, at AI quoting Nawal Saadawy,
an Egyptian feminist now living in the United States, as saying that approximately 40,000
FGM procedures are performed in the United States yearly.
34 See Dugger, supra note 33.
[26:93
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for subjecting her daughter to this operation, as happened in France? 35
Should a mother and her daughter be granted political asylum if they can
show that the child would surely be subjected to FGM if forced to return
home? Canada granted such an asylum in 1993, the first country to do
so, 36 and the United States has just granted asylum to an adult woman
fleeing FGM as a marriage rite.37 Should the operation be made explicitly
illegal? Britain did that in 1985, and in the United States,
Congresswoman Pat Schroeder's bill was finally passed in 1996.
39
It is difficult to make a serious defense of FGM, but let me try to
sketch one. A sort of "mega-defense" mounts the obvious argument that
we ought not to impose our Western ideals upon people from other
cultures, or at least that it is virtually impossible for Westerners to
comment on the procedure in a constructive and culture-sensitive fashion.
Western medicine has mutilated women as well, including clitoridectomy
for "nervousness" and hysterectomy for depression. To quote one Arab
woman, an activist against FGM:
The West has acted as though they have suddenly
discovered a dangerous epidemic which they then
sensationalized in international women's forums creating a
backlash of over-sensitivity in the concerned
communities. They have portrayed it as irrefutable
evidence of the barbarism and vulgarity of
underdeveloped countries . . . . It became a conclusive
validation to the view of the primitiveness of Arabs,
Muslims and Africans all in one blow.
4 1
35 See Marlise Simons, French Court Jails Woman for Daughter's
Circumcision, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1993, at A4.36 See Clyde H. Farnsworth, Canada Gives Somali Mother Refugee Status,
N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 1994, at Al.
37 See Celia W. Dugger, Woman's Pleafor Asylum Puts Tribal Ritual on Trial,
N.Y. TIMES, April 15, 1996, at A2.
38 See Seddon, supra note 27, at 269.
39 See Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C.A. § 116 (West Supp. 1997)).
40 See Council on Scientific Affairs, American Medical Association, Female
Genital Mutilation, 274 JAMA 1714 (1995).
41 Nahid Toubia, Women and Health in Sudan, in WOMEN OF THE ARAB
WORLD: THE COMING CHALLENGE (1988), quoted in Sandra D. Lane & Robert A.
Rubinstein, Judging the Other: Responding to the Traditional Female Genital Surgeries,
26 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 31, 36 (1996) (alteration in original).
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From within the cultures that practice FGM, a number of arguments
are available. To quote one researcher:
Circumcision is the traditional ritual that confers full
social acceptability and integration into the community
upon the females. The ability to identify with one's
heritage and to enjoy recognition as a full member of one's
ethnic group, with just claim to its social privileges and
benefits, is very important to most African families. For
many women and young girls, circumcision satisfies this
deep-seated need to 'belong' and ensures that they will not
be ostracized.42
Even among people who agree that the practice is harmful and ought to be
eradicated, there is a reluctance to flout tradition. If a daughter is not
circumcised, she may well be unable to find a husband within her ethnic
group, and may be ostracized by the others.43 Her choices then are not to
marry at all, or to marry outside her group. Either of those choices, if
repeated among enough girls, could lead to the death of the diaspora
community as a distinctive culture, for example the Nigerian community
in London. Furthermore, a girl who is not circumcised at the "proper"
time because she lives in the United States or the United Kingdom, may
find it impossible to return to the country her family left behind, because
she would have no place there. 44
Looking at these two cases, Yoder and FGM, important similarities
emerge. In both cases, parents, supported by and embedded within a
tightly bound community, wish to make crucial choices about their
children's present and future which are radically at variance with the
Western norm. These choices are made with the child's well-being in
mind, certainly, but with a concept of well-being that sees the role of the
individual as almost indistinguishable from the culture in which he or she
grows up. Parents do not value, perhaps do not even think about, the
concept of children growing up free to make important choices for
themselves: what religion to follow, whether or not to marry within one's
religious or ethnic group, what sort of career to prepare for, etc. The
choices being made here are virtually irrevocable. The Amish child, after
reaching adulthood, may manage to get a high school equivalency degree
42 Note, What's Culture Got to Do With It? Excising the Harmful Tradition of
Female Circumcision, 106 HARv. L. REv. 1944, 1949 (1993).
43 See Seddon, supra note 27, at 264.
44 See id
[26:93
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and be accepted into college or a vocational program, but it will be
extremely difficult. The girl who has undergone FGM, even assuming that
her wounds healed without incident, will always be denied clitoral
pleasure, and will find it almost impossible to marry out of her group.
So if the Amish case is a "close call," as Feinberg says,45 and therefore
on one end of a continuum of judicial and public opinion, I suspect that
FGM is on the other end. Even if issues of pain and infection were
eradicated, the intervention is so serious in its attack on bodily integrity,
its irrevocable nature, and its implications for the child's adult life, few
Westerners would defend it (although we might disagree on the best way
to approach its eradication).
C. Cochlear Implants for Deaf Children
Another group that makes claims somewhat parallel to those of the
Amish is that segment of deaf society which calls itself the DEAF-
WORLD.46  DEAF-WORLD members (who call themselves DEAF or
Deaf as opposed to deal) describe themselves as members of a linguistic
and cultural minority who use American Sign Language and who
participate in "a tight-knit social structure and . . . culture with
characteristic customs, values, and attitudes." 47 Although most Americans
probably would automatically characterize deafness as a disability, many
Deaf members reject this assumption and characterize themselves as a
linguistic, cultural minority on par with being, e.g., Italian-American.
4 8
Particularly in the wake of the Deaf President Now revolution at Gallaudet
University in March of 1988, which is to Deaf Pride what the Stonewall
Riots are to gays and lesbians, Deaf members have been asserting their
claims not merely to equal access but also to equal respect as a cultural
minority.49 In one writer's words, what is needed is a "paradigmatic shift"
in how deafness is viewed, from a "medical model" of a disability that
needs to be "fixed" to a "civil rights model" of a minority deserving equal
45 Feinberg, supra note 6.
4 See Harlan Lane & Michael Grodin, Ethical Issues in Cochlear Implant
Surgery: An Exploration into Disease, Disability, and the Best Interest of the Child, 7
KENNEDY INST. OF ETHICS J. 231, 233-34 (1997).
47 Id.
48 Edward Dolnick, Deafness as Culture, ATLAmNc, Sept. 1993, at 38.
49 See Lane & Grodin, supra note 46, at 247. As Lane and Grodin point out,
there are logical difficulties inherent in claiming both that one is disabled under the
Americans with Disabilities Act and therefore entitled to certain protections to guarantee
equal access, and that one is not disabled and entitled to the respect given to cultural
minorities. Id.
1997]
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respect.5 0  The implications of this claim are wide-ranging and
fascinating.5 ' Many Deaf parents, for example, have a strong preference
for having deaf children, and have expressed interest in using diagnostic
and reproductive techniques to help them increase their likelihood of
having deaf children.
5 2
Another provocative issue involves the use of cochlear implants for
deaf children. Cochlear implants are electronic devices which are
surgically implanted in the inner ear and stimulate surviving nerves in the
ears of patients with profound hearing loss; the implant is linked to a small
external microphone, which is worn behind the ear and linked to a pocket-
sized speech processor, which sends coded information to the implant.
5 3
The devices still are considered experimental, and their success varies.5
4
It is agreed that children who are deafened post-lingually will do better
with implants than those who have never developed language. On the
other hand, if implants are to be used with young, pre-lingually deafened
children, studies suggest that children are more likely to be successful at
developing spoken language if the implants are acquired very early in
life. 5 However, Lane and Grodin state that there is "no case reported in
the scientific literature of a child acquiring spoken language as a result of
implant surgery,"5 6 and that the vast majority of children who are born
deaf and receive implants never even learn to recognize spoken words.
57
Parents desiring to use the technology to increase the likelihood that their
deaf children will enter the hearing world and members of the medical
profession who are advocating implants are engaged in a "bitter and
emotional" debate with Deaf community advocates who argue that
implants constitute "genocide" against the Deaf minority and rob the
individual child of the "birthright" of membership in a rich and supportive
50 Kathryn Ivers, Towards a Bilingual Education Policy in the Mainstreaming
of Deaf Children, 26 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 439, 441, 443 (1995).
51 I explore some ramifications of this stance for genetic counseling in Dena S.
Davis, Genetic Dilemmas and the Child's Right to an Open Future, 28 RUTGERS L.J. 549
(1997). For a different perspective, see Lois Shepherd, Protecting Parents' Freedom to
Have Children with Genetic Differences, 1995 U. ILL. L. REv. 761 (1995).
52 See Walter Nance, Parables, in DiANNE M. BARTELS, PRESCRIBING OUR
FUTURE 92 (1993).
53 See Lane & Grodin, supra note 46, at 235-36.
5 See id at 236.
53 See Amy Elizabeth Brusky, Making Decisions for Deaf Children Regarding
Cochlear Implants: The Legal Ramifications of Recognizing Deafness as a Culture Rather
than a Disability, 1995 Wis. L. REv. 235.
56 Lane & Grodin, supra note 46, at 236.
57 See id.
HeinOnline  -- 26 Cap. U. L. Rev. 102 1997
CHILD'S RIGHT TO AN OPEN FUTURE
Deaf culture. 58 Some Deaf advocates have called for legislation that
would forbid implants for minor children, 59 and others are attempting to
persuade the United States Food and Drug Administration to reverse its
approval of implants for children aged two through seventeen.
60
At present, the very limited success of implants makes it easy to argue
against them. It is all too likely that the (pre-lingually deafened) child will
end up unable to function in either the Deaf or the hearing world, as
parents pour all their resources of time, money, and energy into getting the
child to communicate orally, with little or no success. Meanwhile, the
child, without the benefit of sign language, is missing developmental
milestones that are crucial to good communication skills. 6 1 However,
Lane and Grodin raise the issue of whether cochlear implants would be
ethically acceptable even if they were risk-free and totally effective.62
The arguments advanced by Lane and Grodin are strikingly
reminiscent of those advanced by the Amish parents in Yoder. If the
DEAF-WORLD is a culture, with its own history, language, literature, and
values, in which deaf children can have a happy and productive future,
then cochlear implants, which potentially would be available to almost all
of the 90% of deaf children who are born to hearing parents, 63 would
drasticall reduce the population of that culture, challenging its very
survival. Lane and Grodin proceed on the assumption that "preservation
of minority cultures is a good;" 65 others speak less temperately of a
minority culture's "right to survive."66 In any case, the argument here is
that the majority (hearing) culture, by forcing implants on children, is
threatening the destruction of the minority (Deaf) culture and that this is
ethically wrong and, perhaps, ought to be legally forbidden or at least
discouraged. The difference, of course, between this case and the Amish
is that, in Yoder, it is the parents themselves who represent the minority
culture; their desire to have their children be like them, and their desire to
have their children participate in the minority culture are one and the
same. Thus, the Amish can align a number of powerful legal and ethical
arguments: free exercise of religion, the continued survival of their
5. See Brusky, supra note 55, at 235.
59 See id. at 324.
60 See id.
61 See Lane & Grodin, supra note 46, at 236.
62 See id. at 232.
63 See id. at 233.
6 See id. at 237.
65 Id.
66 See, e.g., Brusky, supra note 55, at 243.
1997]
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culture, and the right of parents to make decisions about their children's
schooling.
In the case of cochlear implants for children of hearing parents, the
parents' right to make medical and educational decisions for their minor
children is pitted against the claims of the Deaf community for continued
survival.6 7 Thus, it is very unlikely that an American court would ever
accede to the wishes of Deaf activists to block a parental decision in favor
of implants. However, there are other situations in which the balance
between the demands of the Deaf and the hearing world are more equal,
and thus somewhat more akin to Yoder. For example, what if a deaf
newborn was available for adoption, and a court had to decide between a
hearing family that would use cochlear implants to draw the child into the
hearing world, and a Deaf family that would rear the child within the Deaf
culture with American Sign Language. What if the decision about
implants became an issue in a child custody dispute between divorcing
parents with different philosophies? What if implants become safe and
effective, and Deaf parents have to defend in 'court their decision not to
have their own deaf children implanted? Will they, like the Amish, have
to defend themselves against allegations of child neglect for deciding not
to give their children the tools with which to enter the majority culture?
CONCLUSION
My purpose here is not to defend my belief that Yoder was wrongly
decided, but to challenge our assumptions about the issues represented in
that case, and especially to challenge the importance given in Yoder to the
claims of culture and cultural survival. If the deference given to culture in
Yoder is correct, than ought we to give more respect to the wishes of
African immigrants to America who wish to preserve their culture by
subjecting their daughters to FGM, especially if bringing it under the aegis
of medical practice (like male circumcision) would render it virtually
pain-free and risk-free? 68 And how do we explain our legal deference to
67 Lane and Grodin raise the question of whether Deaf adults have some sort of
parental rights over deaf children born to hearing parents, in somewhat the same way in
which the law acknowledges the interest of Native American tribes in Native American
children. See Lane & Grodin, supra note 46, at 247-48.
68 An interesting by-way is the story of some Seattle physicians who attempted
to find a constructive solution by agreeing to consider making a "ritual nick of the prepuce
• . . with no removal of tissue, 'as a way of responding to repeated requests by Somali
mothers that the physicians do the full-scale procedure on their daughters."' See Dugger,
supra note 33. However, the physicians' hospital abandoned the proposal after they were
inundated with protesting letters and calls, and after a state representative informed them
(continued)
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Amish culture but not to the African culture and use it to make some
predictions about how well the DEAF culture will fare in America? If we
adopt Lane and Grodin's useful thought experiment and hypothesize a
future where cochlear implants are risk free and totally effective, then
ought their use be mandated for all babies born deaf? Should hearing and
DEAF parents alike be considered negligent for not having their children
implanted? What weight should be given to the argument by DEAF
parents that, first, they wish their children to be like them, and second,
they wish to preserve DEAF culture by making sure that their children
choose to stay within it?
These are difficult questions. One reason Yoder was a relatively
noncontroversial decision (outside the world of legal scholarship) is that
the Amish are quaint, colorful, familiar icons of the American countryside
(as well as a lucrative tourist attraction). They are different, but not too
different (they are, after all, white, Protestant, and of European descent).
Because they do not vote, run for public office, or seek to convert our
children, we are content to leave them alone. It is easy to sentimentalize
their claims for cultural survival over individual self-determination. But
we should not let the familiarity of the Amish, and the relative
innocuousness of their demand to deprive their children of only two years
of school, blind us to the implications of the choice made by the Yoder
majority. By placing two other examples in juxtaposition to Yoder, I hope
I have raised some disquieting questions.
that they would be in violation of a new state law. See id. Since it appears that the Seattle
proposal would result in an operation no more risky, disfiguring, or painful than male
circumcision, why was it vilified when male circumcision is a common and uncontroversial
practice? Male circumcision, after all, has no benefits other than custom, and-for
Muslims and Jews--the fulfillment of a religious obligation. The recommendations of the
Canadian Paediatric Society and the American Academy of Pediatricians is that
"[c]ircumcision of newborns should not be routinely performed." Neonatal Circumcision
Revisited. Fetus and Newborn Committee, Canadian Paediatric Society 154 CANADIAN
MED. ASS'N J. 769, 769 (1996). If the new law really does proscribe even a "ritual nick"
performed under sterile procedures, does the law discriminate against the religious practices
of some cultures while protecting those of others who have more political clout in
America? (The question of whether FGM is required by Muslim law is controversial. See,
e.g., John Lancaster, Egyptian Court Overturns Decree that Banned Female Circumcision,
WASH. POST, June 25, 1997, at A26.)
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